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Reviewed  how  LWRs  have  coped  with  “water  radiolysis”,  during  normal  operation  to  severe  accidents.
Concluded  “water  radiolysis”  is  not  likely  a route  course  of  the  hydrogen  explosions  at Fukushima.
Performed  modeling  studies  based  on “radiation-induced  electrolysis”  on Unit  1–Unit  4.
Generation  of several  tens  of  thousands  cubic  meters  hydrogen  gas  is  predicted  before  the  hydrogen  explosions.
Upon  SBO,  early  safe  disposal  of  hydrogen  from  RPVs  is indispensable  in  BWRs.
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Since  the  scientiﬁc  cause  for a  series  of hydrogen  explosions  during  the  Fukushima  accident  has  not
been established,  the  author  investigated  his  basic  theory  named  “radiation-induced  electrolysis  (RIE)”
by applying  the  estimation  of  the  amounts  of  H2 generation  during  the active  phase  of the  Fukushima
accident. The  author’s  theory  was  originally  developed  by  including  Faraday’s  law  of  electrolysis  into  the
basic  time-dependent  material  balance  equation  of  radiation-chemical  species  for his  study  on  accel-
erated  corrosion  phenomena  which  is  widely  observed  in  aged plants.  As  such  this  theory  applies  to
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the  early  phase  of  the  accident  before  the loss  of  water  levels  in  the  reactor  cores,  although  the  simulations
were performed  from  the  time  of seismic  reactor  trip  to the  hydrogen  explosions  in this paper.
Through  this  mechanism  as  much  as 29,400  m3-STP  of hydrogen  gas  is estimated  to be  accumulated  inside
the PCV just  prior  to  the hydrogen  explosion  which  occurred  one  day  after the  reactor  trip in  1F1.  With
this large volume  of  hydrogen  gas  the  explosion  was  a viable  possibility  upon  the  “venting”  operation.  In
view of  this  observation,  hydrogen  generation  from  the  spent  fuel  pools  was  also  investigated.
For  the investigation  of  the  1F4  SFP,  the  pool  water temperature  and  ﬂow  velocity  due  to  natural  circulation
were changed  widely  to identify  conditions  of large  hydrogen  generation.  During  the  trial  calculations
it was  discovered  that  SBO  induced  a rapid  initiation  of electrolysis  when  the  pool  water  temperature
surpassed  40 ◦C  with  a range  of  low  water  ﬂow  velocity  through  the  spent  fuels.
With  a mix  of different  levels  of radioactivity  of spent  fuel,  a difference  in  the  absorbed  dose rate  of
water through  -decay  heat  should  have  existed.  This  conﬁguration  induced  an  electrochemical  potential
difference  between  the highly  radioactive  region  where  there  was  spent  fuel  stored  by evacuating  the
core  and  less  radioactive  fuels  stored  for several  years.  The  spent  fuel  was  stored  in racks  placed  at  the
bottom  of the  pool  where  the  wall  was  covered  with  a stainless  steel  lining.  The  metallic  contacts  enabled
electric  conduction  between  the  highly  radioactive  fuel  assemblies  and  the cooled  spent  fuel.
© 2016  The  Author(s).  Publis
Nomenclature
BWR  boiling water reactor
CHC critical hydrogen concentration
CVCS chemical and volume control system
DH dissolved hydrogen
ECCS emergency core cooling system
ECP electrochemical corrosion potential
HPCS high-pressure core spray
IC isolation condenser
LET linear energy transfer
LWR  light water reactor
RPV reactor pressure vessel
PCV primary containment vessel
QSSA quasi-steady state approximation
RHRS residual heat removal system
RIE radiation-induced electrolysis
SBO station blackout (loss of all AC power sources)
SC suppression chamber
SFP spent fuel pool
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. Introduction
A series of hydrogen explosions were undoubtedly the most
ramatic events observed during the accident, however, its root-
ause is one of the least known. Almost all of the investigation
eports published by the National Government and Japanese Par-
iament as well as TEPCO’s Investigation Committee explain the
ccident scenario as a tsunami-induced SBO which resulted in
he core “melt-down” accidents (Nuclear Emergency Response
eadquarters, 2011a, 2011b; National Diet of Japan, 2012;
nvestigation Committee, 2012; TEPCO, 2012). The resultant high
emperature Zr-steam reaction generated a large amount of hydro-
en gas, which leaked into the Reactor Building and then exploded.
TEPCO estimated amounts of hydrogen generation by employ-
ng severe accident analysis codes such as MELCOR, MAAP and
AMPSON. Unfortunately the predicted accident sequences and
rocess data have not been validated with conﬁdence due to the
nsufﬁcient amount of reliable ﬁeld data available during the active
hase of the accident.
For example, in 1F1, total failure of Isolation Condenser (IC) and
igh Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) has to be assumed disabled due
o the tsunami which arrived 51 min  after the seismic reactor triphed  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
triggered on 14:46, March 11, 2011. However, the operators visu-
ally (i.e., by observing the ejection of steam from the exhaust pipe)
conﬁrmed that IC was judged working at 16:44, 18:18 and 21:30 on
March 11 (TEPCO, 2012). The water level in RPV was  barely show-
ing at TAF (Top of Active Fuel) + 200 mm at 20:50 March 11 and
TAF + 450 mm  at 22:10 on the same day. This indicates that even
HPCS, with its battery power, may have been working even after
the arrival of the tsunami. With these objective observations, it is
hard to believe the early melt-down scenario inducing hydrogen
generation through Zr-steam reaction.
In spite of the widely accepted scenario, Prof. S. Murayama
investigated this issue by developing a detailed time-dependent
heat balance tool and concluded that “the IC was  working after
the tsunami arrival” (Maruyama, 2015). In addition to the discrep-
ancy of theoretical simulations and objective ﬁeld data, TEPCO has
not been able to identify any evidence demonstrating the exist-
ence of corium (molten fuel debris) despite their investigation of
the reactors inside the PCV as of 2015.
The most recent information directly related to the current sta-
tus of the core is as follows. On March 19, 2015, TEPCO released their
ﬁrst snapshots of the cosmic-ray muon imaging detectors devel-
oped for 1F1. Although the resolution of this technology was only
1 m2 due to the transmission method, the current data implies that
no large fuel debris was left in the original core position, it is likely
relocated below the core support plates (TEPCO’s website, 2015a).
Also on March 20, Nagoya University released an impressive report,
which supports the core disintegration also in 1F2. They have been
working on measuring muons since the spring of 2014, by using
the muon particle detection system, which employs nuclear emul-
sion plate technology. This investigation focused on 1F2, where core
melt is suspected due to the accident, and 1F5 where the fuels have
been conﬁrmed intact. The results revealed that the material mass
in the 1F2 core region is 0–30% of the corresponding mass in 1F5
(Nagoya Univ., 2015).
Despite these muon imaging results TEPCO’s recent robotic
inspection inside the PCV of 1F1 identiﬁed only some sedimen-
tation on the grating ﬂoor surrounding the lower portion of RPV
(TEPCO’s website, 2015b). This sedimentation is likely due to
drooped anti-rusting paint (applied on the inner surface of PCV)
molten due to an elevated temperature of only a few hundred centi-
grade but not consisting with the core melt-through event. It is
difﬁcult to explain the scenario of core melt followed with relo-
cation to the PCV down to the PCV ﬂoor. Most of the core debris
is likely still retained within the RPV. It is necessary to revisit the
melt-through scenario which predicts the zirconium-steam reac-
tion for the hydrogen generation by employing the severe accident
analysis codes.
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. Water radiolysis in LWRs
In view of these conﬂicting reports the author will ﬁrst review
he water radiolysis phenomena which release hydrogen gas to elu-
idate how nuclear plants have been designed to cope with the
ffects of radiation on water. This is to look for some peculiar conﬁg-
ration which may  have induced the hydrogen generation during
he Fukushima accident. In general, water radiolysis has not been
onsidered to produce a large amount of hydrogen in a short time.
The radiolysis of water is deﬁned as a process of decomposition
f water (H2O) into di-oxygen (O2) and di-hydrogen (H2) due to
onizing radiation. The term water radiolysis is applied here as a
arrower deﬁnition of the more general radiation-chemical reac-
ions as deﬁned as:
2O + “radiation′′
→ [e−aq, OH, H, HO2/O2−, H2, O2, H2O2, H+aq, OH−aq] (1)
When water is irradiated, it produces radical species (e.g., e−aq,
H, H and HO2/O2−), stable ionic species (H+aq and OH−aq) as
ell as stable molecular products (e.g., H2 O2 and H2O2). Through
omplex chain reactions the ﬁnal products are stable molecular
roducts that are either in gaseous form or dissolved in water when
heir concentrations are low enough. The stable ionic species are
eldom measured since they chemically interact with other ionic
pecies contained in the reactor water.
.1. PWR  and critical hydrogen concentration
The Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) investigated the critical
ydrogen concentration (CHC) required to suppress the net radi-
lytic production of oxygen and hydrogen. The CHC is the minimum
oncentration of dissolved hydrogen required to prevent the net
adiolytic breakdown of water. Radiolysis is said to be suppressed
hen there is no net decomposition of the water with the addi-
ion of an excess hydrogen (Elliot and Bartels, 2009). This occurs
hen the concentration of oxygen and hydrogen peroxide are much
ower than 1 g/kg, i.e., <−10−8 mol/kg.
It is worth noting that an excess of hydrogen is dosed in the pri-
ary coolant water of PWRs in order to prevent the accumulation
f oxidant products (e.g., O2 and H2O2) generally considered to be
esponsible for the corrosion of the primary system. The reactor
ater is puriﬁed by extracting a small portion of the primary water
hrough CVCS, where hydrogen is puriﬁed and stored for recycling.
owever in practice, dissolved hydrogen will barely scavenge the
adical species sufﬁciently before they convert much of the H2O2
ack to water due to the short irradiation time in the core. It has also
een shown that water decomposition by radiolysis in the presence
f H2 is a threshold phenomenon as a function of the LET of radi-
tion (Caër, 2011). The reactivity control process with boric acid
nduces a signiﬁcant alpha dose rate in PWR  plants. In addition,
ecoil protons due to the scattering of fast neutrons induce track-
veraged LET of several tens of eV/nm (Elliot and Bartels, 2009). It
s likely that the water radiolysis is taking place in PWRs in spite of
ydrogen dosing with the recoil proton and alpha irradiation.
.2. Hydrogen generation and its processing in BWRs
The decomposition of water by radiation occurs even during
ormal operations in BWRs. In a Japanese licensing document
PSAR, Preliminary Safety Analysis Report) of a 1100 MWe  BWR,
he following description is given. “The waste gas extracted from
he turbine condenser contains hydrogen gas and oxygen gas. . .
hey are diluted at the air ejector using steam ejection down to
 vol%, which is below a hydrogen ignition concentration. Further, Design 307 (2016) 64–76
the hydrogen gas and oxygen gas are re-combined back to water
and disposed ﬁnally by a gaseous waste disposal system.”
Although the water radiolysis in BWRs is a well-known phe-
nomenon, its exact mechanism is not well deﬁned, in the author’s
opinion. It is likely due to a combination of the irradiation of boil-
ing water, the un-closed conﬁguration of the BWR  plants and water
chemistry without excess hydrogen dosing above CHC. In spite of
these provisions there have been some incidences when the extrac-
tion of the hydrogen gas was not completely accomplished in the
cooling system during normal operation. The hydrogen gas accu-
mulated in air-pockets, such as located at the top vertical pipes and
instrumentation piping, had exploded in several plants. This mech-
anism is important to understand the Fukushima accident, since a
worker observed a rapidly increasing accumulated dose (0.8 mSv)
as early as 21:31, March 11 while trying to enter the 1F1 Reactor
Building. This observation is sometimes considered an evidence
of a seismically induced pipe break or early core melt by some
scientists.
In Germany, on 14 December 2001, a pipe break occurred inside
the containment vessel of the Brunsbüttel BWR. The explosion took
place in the so-called reactor core spray system area, which sprays
cold water into the reactor vessel to cool down the reactor and
remove residual heat in case of an emergency shutdown. When
the reactor core spray system was inspected it revealed that a 10-
cm diameter pipe had totally disintegrated over a length of 2–3 m.
Although there is no clear explanation for the explosion it is sus-
pected that a hydrogen explosion occurred (Brunsbüttel reactor,
2002).
Prior to this accident a pipe burst occurred in Japan’s Hamaoka-1
BWR on November 7, 2001 (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency,
2002; Naito et al., 2003a,b). When the HPCS was  started up for a
routine test operation, a pipe ruptured and radioactive efﬂuent was
released into the reactor building. The reactor was in a normal state
of power operation. A brief outline of this accident is summarized
in Appendix A. It was  later disclosed that there were 8 other inci-
dents linked to hydrogen explosions that have been experienced
inside TEPCO’s instrumentation and control systems at several BWR
plants, where air pockets or stagnant water/gas separation was
likely (TEPCO website, 2003, in Japanese).
It remains a mystery how the hydrogen- and oxygen gases are
generated and separated from the water in the HPCS, accumulated
in an air pocket and then ignited. The hydrogen generation through
water radiolysis has been well known however, how the presence
of oxygen in stoichiometric amount indicates a potential involve-
ment of radiolysis. This mode of “internal” hydrogen explosion may
have occurred in 1F1 at around 21:51, March 11 since TEPCO’s crew
detected high dose rate inside the reactor building. Due to SBO the
forced water circulation was not available which should have facil-
itated separation of hydrogen and oxygen gas from the water at a
air pocket.
2.3. Water radiolysis in open/closed systems
Irradiation of pure water in a closed system by low-LET radi-
ation leads to the establishment of a steady state in which low
concentrations of hydrogen, oxygen and hydrogen peroxide are
present (Spinks and Woods, 1990). However, under certain condi-
tions hydrogen gas is released from the water under irradiation.
Sophie Le Caër reviewed the mechanisms accounting for the
radiolysis of water with an emphasis on H2 production and the
modiﬁcations of H2 production in radiolysis at water/oxide inter-
face (Caër, 2011).According to the textbook, “irradiation of pure water in a system
that is not closed leads to buildup of a steady-state concentra-
tion of hydrogen peroxide in solution and the continual escape
of hydrogen and oxygen from the system; in effect, the radiation
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ecomposes the water into hydrogen and oxygen.” This conﬁgura-
ion represents the BWR’s reactor water inside the RPV. However
he author was unsuccessful in conﬁrming this phenomenon
hrough radiation chemical calculations. It released oxygen instead
f hydrogen in a trial calculation. The actual behavior is much com-
licated as demonstrated in the following chapters.
.4. Scoping estimation of water radiolysis for the Fukushima
ccident
The author has published a scoping estimation of the hydro-
en generation through water radiolysis without considering the
adiation-chemical chain reactions (Saji, 2014a). The accumulated
olumes of hydrogen gas until the hydrogen explosions were
50/1100/900 m3-STP for 1F1/1F2/1F3, respectively. By consider-
ng the reverse chain reactions, the volumes of hydrogen gas were
uch less than 100 m3-STP, an order of magnitude less than the
stimation made simply by using G-values. Through this estima-
ion it was concluded that the water radiolysis should not be the
oot cause for the series of hydrogen explosions (Saji, 2014a,b).
.5. Hydrogen release and explosion during the Fukushima
aiichi accident
In the Fukushima Daiichi BWR  plants the radiolytic hydrogen
as generated through gamma  radiation from the fuel inside the
PV but it appears not to have been retained within the reactor
ater. The dissolved hydrogen gas was separated inside the RPV
f the BWR, since the top half of RPV was ﬁlled with steam while
he reactor water was at the bottom half. Upon the termination of
he decay heat removal systems the RPV pressure soon increased
bove the set points of the SRVs due to the boiling and started to
elease steam to the suppression pool. The safety valve function
as mechanical and automatically released the overpressure into
he Suppression Chamber (SC) of the PCV even with SBO. It also
hould have released hydrogen gas into the SC which eventually
pread to the entire PCV.
To cope with potential generation of hydrogen gas in an event of
esign basis LOCA the Fukushima Daiichi plants had Standby Gas
reatment Systems (SGTS). The hydrogen gas generated through
he zirconium-steam reaction should have ﬁrst been re-combined
rior to release. An emergency electrical power source was nec-
ssary for the operation of the SGTS; but it was  not available due
o the SBO. Without this system hydrogen gas generated through
ater radiolysis kept accumulating inside the PCV. Upon venting
f the PCV the hydrogen gas back-ﬂowed into the Reactor Building
hrough ventilation ducts which triggered the hydrogen explosion.
. “Radiation-induced electrolysis” (RIE)
The review of water radiolysis as summarized in Chapter 2 gen-
rally concludes that the “water radiolysis” is unlikely the root
ause of the large amount of hydrogen generation which occurred
uring the Fukushima Daiichi accident. With this notion, the author
nvestigated the applicability of his basic theory entitled “radiation-
nduced electrolysis (RIE)” for the estimation of the amounts of H2
eneration during the active phase of the Fukushima accident.
The RIE is induced in metallic components through which the
onduction-electrons ﬂow to the cathodic region whose redox
otential is elevated due to radiation. This mechanism is different
rom “radiolysis” which is the dissociation of molecules through
he direct exposure of nuclear radiation.The author’s theory was originally developed by including Fara-
ay’s law of electrolysis into the basic time-dependent material
alance equation of radiation-chemical species for his study on
ccelerated corrosion phenomena widely observed in aged plants. Design 307 (2016) 64–76 67
As such this theory applies to the early phase of the accident before
the loss of water levels in the reactor cores, although simulations
were performed from the time of seismic reactor trip to the time of
hydrogen explosions in this paper.
3.1. Evidence of RIE
The RIE hypothesis was  proposed based on experimental
observations demonstrating the electrical potential differences
between the irradiated and the non-irradiated regions of the water
contained in the metallic loops modeling LWRs. The potential
difference should have induced electrolysis resulting in the decom-
position of water into hydrogen and oxygen.
For the BWR  water chemistry sphere there are several exper-
imental evidence demonstrating that irradiation can induce
potential differences between the irradiated and un-irradiated
regions, which is an interesting mechanism speciﬁc to the nuclear
reactor environment. Although this effect is well established
through many independent experiments which have been assessed
by the author (Saji, 2010a), there are very few “controlled”
experiments which are robust enough to withstand further the-
oretical studies. When there exists a potential difference, there
should be various RIE phenomena2 driven by the electrical
current.
More recently redox potential differences were published for
BWR-NWC (Kysela et al., 2001; Zmikto, 2003) as well as for PWR
(Takiguchi et al., 2000, 2004). These report demonstrated the exist-
ence of +0.1(BWR-NWC) to +0.3(PWR) V ECP differences between
the in-ﬂux ECP electrode and those at the out-of-ﬂux regions. The
author has been trying to theoretically reconstruct these experi-
mental evidences by integrating Faraday’s law of electrolysis into
the radiation chemical material balance equation (Saji, 2016a,b). At
this stage it is still necessary to conﬁrm or determine the weight
of the radiation-induced perturbation to the Nernst equation by
introducing the “conductive-dielectric correction.” The qualitative
discussion supports the reason why  this correction factor is as large
as 11.6 for BWR-NWC while it is 1.0 for PWR  when the proton
hopping model is incorporated in the latter. In spite of these reser-
vations, the author’s initial objective is now basically completed
by establishing the RIE as the root cause for the peculiar corrosion
phenomena being experienced in aged LWRs.
The demonstration of the applicability of the RIE mechanism in
the corrosion study is rather complicated, since it is necessary to
convert the concentrations of radiation chemical species into the
potentiometric unit of electromotive force (i.e., volt). The concen-
tration of radiation chemical species were obtained by applying
the “improved” QSSA method which provides solutions through
the Lagrangean formalism, although the Eularian time integration
method is more widely applied in the radiation chemistry arena.
The applicability of the improved” QSSA is somewhat controversial.
Further details will be discussed in Section 3.4.
However, the estimation of the amount of hydrogen generation
in the event of a severe accident is more straightforward since it
is calculated directly from the radiation chemical material balance
equation. The only new idea is in the incorporation of Faraday’s law
on electrolysis in the radiation chemical material balance equation.
This approach is motivated from the review of the basic corrosion
hypothesis as summarized in the author’s conference paper (Saji,2 The word “electrolysis” is used in this report to imply that both hydrogen- and
oxygen gases may be generated sometimes in an stoichiometric amount, in contrast
to  another mechanism of “water radiolysis” which occurs in non-metallic systems.
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current icathode, the Faraday constant F and the total surface area8 G. Saji / Nuclear Engineerin
.2. Mechanism of RIE
The observed potential difference was measured through in-
ile tests with an equivalent hydrogen standard electrode which
s formulated by dosing the primary water with hydrogen gas in
WRs and a standard electrode that is inserted in the ﬂux region.3
n the measurement, the potential of the electrode was raised by
.1(BWR-NWC)–0.3(PWR) V by applying an external battery to
ope with the redox potential. Note that the hydrated electrons,
ith their short lifetime, do not ﬂow directly to the electrode but
ather they raised the redox potential of the water and induce elec-
rochemical electron current from the cathodic metallic wall to the
ater, as in the case of electrical batteries through:
H+ + 2e−cathode → H2 (2)
Generation of hydrogen through Eq. (2) may  not result in an
ncrease of the hydrogen concentration at the core region due to
he fact that the concentration is determined by an overall radiation
hemical material balance combined with the in-core dose rate. In
he situation of in-core concentrations that are higher than the out-
f-core region, hydrogen is reverted back to hydrogen ion at the
ut-of-core region through oxidation of hydrogen:
2 → 2H+ + 2e−cathode (3)
ere the excess e−cathode is transported back to the cathodic reactor
ore region through piping thereby closing the electron conducting
ircuit. Should this mechanism be absent, such a system will shift
o the state of water radiolysis in an open conﬁguration in the BWR
hereas in the PWR, due to its closed conﬁguration, the system
ill lead to the establishment of an autonomous steady state as
escribed in Section 2.3. With such a conﬁguration the hydrogen
r oxygen concentration should become uncontrollable contrary to
he in-pile tests where these concentrations are adjusted for water
hemistry control.
The set of electrochemical reactions between the in-core and
ut-of-core regions results in a net effect of conduction electrons
i.e., long-cell current) ﬂowing from the cathodic surface (e.g., fuel
ladding) into the redox water. The hydrated electrons release their
nergy into the redox water contributing to the higher potential.
he (more positive) higher potential with the redox water repels
he positive charged ions (e.g., H+) toward the metallic walls to
eact with cathodic electrons when the reactor water is conductive
ith solute ions as in the case of the PWR  water chemistry. When
he conductivity is small as in the case of BWR-NWC, the dielectric
roperty should be identiﬁed.
This simpliﬁed interpretation is important to understand the
ole of other radical reactions without a charge transfer, consisting
f the reaction of a “reductive” H radical, and an “oxidizing” OH
adical and a stable molecular product H2O2. The author’s radia-
ion chemical calculation includes the overall material balance of
hese species in computing the concentration of oxidized species
uch as hydrogen [H2] and [O2] in the primary water; however rad-
cal reactions are not included in the charge transfer process at the
lectrode.
The author has shown that such a potential difference is induced
hrough the annihilation of hydrated electrons (e−aq) generated
nder radiation (Saji, 2010a,b, 2013a,b). However e−aq, with their
hort lifetime, do not ﬂow directly to the electrode. Rather the
ydrated electrons generated in the core region participate in rais-
ng the redox potential of the water and induce an electron current
rom the metallic wall to the water, as in the case of electrical
atteries.
3 For simplicity purposes, the hydrogen polarization case is discussed here since
ur  interest is on hydrogen generation. Design 307 (2016) 64–76
3.3. Electrolytic generation of hydrogen and oxygen
The most common electrochemical charge transfer reactions
occurring on the surface of the electrodes for LWRs include;
2H+ + 2e−cathode = H2 (4)
O2(aq) + 4H+ + 4e−cathode = 2H2O (5)
H2O2 + 2H+ + 2e−cathode = 2H2O and (6)
O2 + 2H+ + 2e−cathode = H2O2 (7)
These reactions can be generally expressed as:
Ox + ne−cathode ↔ Rx (8)
where Ox is the oxidized- and Rx is the reduced species and n is the
electric charge transferred through the particular reaction involved.
These reactions provide electrodes on the surface of metal when
e−cathode is removed by the equilibrium electrochemical potential,
Eo, of the irradiated water.
Note that Eq. (4) represents the dominant electrochemical
reaction in the PWR  water chemistry environment, whereas Eqs.
(3)–(5) are major reactions in the case of BWRs. As a matter of
fact, the author’s theoretical study on the NRI-Rez’s in-pile test
results revealed that the out-of-ﬂux potential was  expressed by Eq.
(5) + 0.396 Eq. (7), whose potential is upshifted due to the residual
hydrogen peroxide in the out-of-ﬂux region (Saji, 2016a).
3.4. Theory of RIE
Since detailed development and veriﬁcation have already been
published (Saji, 2010a, 2013a,b, Saji, 2014c, 2016a,b), only the
essential portion is presented in this section. The basic time
dependent material balance equation for Ox in the radiation
chemical environment can be described in Eq. (9), when the elec-
trochemical processes (i.e., Faraday’s law) are included in a “point
model” (where the ﬂux region is lumped together into a single
water volume Vo), as:
dCOx
dt
=  {G(Ox)D˙ +
∑
qr
kOxqr CqCr +  ˙CinOx}
− COx{
∑
s
kOx,sCs +  ˙}  + AoicathodenFVo (9)
where Ci is the concentration expressed in mol/dm3 for species Xi,
G(Ox), the G-value in mol/J for species Ox D˙  is the absorbed dose
rate of water in J/dm3, kis is the rate constant between species Xi
and Xs in dm3 mol−1 s−1. The rate constants kiqr (represented for the
second order reactions) between species Xq and Xr, have non-zero
values only when the reactant species is Xi, in dm3 mol−1 s−1. The
‘normalized’ volumetric ﬂow rate v˙ represents the ﬂow rate (1/s) of
the coolant in the active region within a point model and Cinox is the
concentration of the Ox in the incoming ﬂow, which applies to the
stable molecular species4 such as H2, O2 and H2O2.
Note that the third term provides the corresponding incoming
or removing ﬂux of species Ox due to electrolysis at the metal-
lic surface through Faraday’s law. As such a numerical simulation,
(dCOx/dt)electrolysis was calculated without decomposing the thirdof the cathode Ao. In the simulation, the net ﬂux of Ox due to the
4 The incoming ﬂow of hydrogen ions [H+] and hydroxyl anions [OH−] should
also  be included in this formalism in principle however; the deviation is small due
to  Ostwald’s law except at the lower ends of the DH and DO concentrations.
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Table  1
Operational history of Daiichi.
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
Po 1380 MWt  2381 MWt  2381 MWt
elapsed 1–24 h (variable) 1–155.2 h (variable) 1–70 h (variable)
s 1.46E+07 s (169 d). 9.763E+06 s (113d). 9.763E+06 s (113 d)
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IE is determined to maintain the material balance of the radiation
hemical conﬁguration under investigation.
In the steady state, Eq. (9) is simpliﬁed to Eq. (10):
Ox =
G(Ox)D˙ +∑qrkOxqr CqCr + ˙CinOx + Aoicathode/nFVo∑
sk
Ox
s + ˙
(10)
n the last term of Eq. (9), representing the electrolytic genera-
ion/removal of Ox,  the sign of icathode is assigned as positive current
or the forward reaction (reaction to the right) in Eq. (8). It is impor-
ant to point out that the cathode current can be introduced through
xternal systems coupled with the water chemistry conﬁguration
utside of the radiation chemical system under consideration in the
oint model.
Whereas the concentrations of the short-lived radical species
re calculated by Eq. (11):
i = {G(Xi)D˙ +
∑
qr
kiqrCqCr}/{
∑
s
kiisCs} (11)
The simpliﬁcation with a set of Eqs. (10) and (11) is called
improved” QSSA in which the concentrations of radical species, Eq.
11), jump promptly to the new concentrations due to their short
ime constants. It is widely used for the integration of “stiff” ordi-
ary differential equations5 arising from the photolysis effects in
he atmospheric chemistry arena (Jay et al., 1995). When the equa-
ion dealing with long-lived molecular species is not separated from
he equation for short-lived radical species such simpliﬁcation is
alled the “plain” (i.e., original) QSSA.6 The latter may  not result in
ppropriate solutions as discussed by Farrow and Edelson (1974).
For further quantitative discussions, it became increasingly
mportant to use the established radiation- and electro-chemistry
ata sets in order to proceed any further. Dr. A.J. Elliot of AECL
nd Prof. S.M. Bartels of Notre Dame Radiation Laboratory (here-
fter called “E-B data”) released a new set of data in 2009 (Elliot
nd Bartels, 2009). The author has incorporated this information to
erify previous calculations published in earlier papers.
In solving the set of equations in the improved QSSA, it was
ecessary to calculate the change in dose rate due to decreasing
ecay heat in 1F2–1F3 (under the constant temperature) or the
ncreasing pool water temperature in 1E4 (with constant dose rate).
hese data were calculated by using the functional representation
f radiation chemical data set as provided in the reference (Elliot
nd Bartels, 2009). These variation were incorporated in ﬁnite dif-
erence representation of the radiation chemical material balance
quations.
5 In mathematics, a stiff equation is a differential equation for which certain
umerical methods for solving the equation are unstable, unless the step size is
aken to be extremely small.
6 The “improved” QSSA is more useful for practical engineering applications, since
t  is formulated in the Lagrangean coordinate, although the time-integration scheme
n  Eulerian co-ordinate is more widely used among radiation chemists.:14, March 15, 2011 11:01, March 14, 2011
3.5. Modeling study of hydrogen generation in 1F1–1F3
(1) In-vessel natural circulation should occur through the jet
pumps. Dissolved hydrogen is mixed and diluted with large vol-
ume  of reactor water in the upper and lower plenums before
ﬂowing to the core region.
(2) The reactor core region is cathodic due to radiation, whereas
out-of-core region is anodic in the reactor water, comprising a
“differential radiation cell”.
(3) The electrons generated at the surface of the anodic out-of-core
components are transported to the fuel rods. These components
are in direct metallic contact facilitating the ﬂow of electrons.
(4) Excess hydrogen is released from the core region. Over pressure
due to boiling is released together with hydrogen through SRV
to the suppression pool, eventually diffused inside of the PCV.
3.5.1. Decay heat and plant parameters
The following empirical equation accounts for both gamma  as
well as beta energy releases in the decay heat estimation (McMaster
Nuclear Reactor, 1998).
(1) P/Po(  ˇ + ) = 0.066[elapsed−0.2 − (s − elapsed)−0.2], where
elapsed is the time that elapsed after the reactor shutdown, s
is the time of the reactor startup.
(2) P/Po(ˇ) = 0.031[elapsed−0.2 − (s − elapsed)−0.2].
(3) Operational history (Table 1).
(4) Plant parameters (Table 2).
3.5.2. Radiation-chemical data
The radiation-chemical analysis uses data developed by AECL’s
A.J. Elliot and D.M. Bartels.
(5) g(H2)-value
0.62 per 100 eV at 290 ◦C = 0.10364 × 0.62 (mM/J)
Note that this is the primary yield and does not provide the
concentration of hydrogen after going through a chain of radical
reactions.
(6) Rate constant dataRate constant data were calculated from the
functional representation as provided in Reference (Elliot and
Bartels, 2009) as performed in the author’s corrosion studies.
(7) Equilibria and associated rate constants of H2OA change in the
pH and concentration of water (in mol/L) with respect to the
temperature was  calculated from the polynomial representa-
tion of pKH2O provided in reference (Elliot and Bartels, 2009).
(8) Radiation chemical calculationA series of radiation chemical
calculations were performed by applying the “improved QSSA”.
3.5.3. Results of estimation of H2 generation
The plant data assumed in the following modeling study are
summarized in Tables 1–3. The “mixing water volume” listed in
Table 2, is the volume of water in which the fuel assemblies are
submerged, typically the total water hold-up in RPVs or SFPs. The
mixing effect dilutes the DH concentration of the irradiated water
before it recycled back to the entrance of the fuel assemblies. This
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Table 2
Plant parameters for scoping estimation.
Unit 1 Units 2–3 Unit 4
Total thermal power (MWt)  1380 2381 1.95 (note 1)
Effective core dia (m) 3.439 4.03 –
Irradiated H2O inventory (m3) 22.8 27.7 166 (SPF) (note 1)
Mixing water volume (m3) 200 (RPV) 300 (RPV) 1425 (SFP)
Water temp (◦C) 290 290 20–100 (parameter)
Note: The following sets were also tested: 1.95 MWt/166 m3; 1.95 MWt/50 m3; 1.83 MWt/80.7 m3. The last set represents the
dominant decay heat from the last 24th and the last to one 23rd fuel cycles.
Table 3
Scoping estimation of accumulated hydrogen gas in PCV until the H2 explosion.
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
3 86,200 58,800
06:14, March 15, 2011 11:01, March 14, 2011
155.2 h 68.2 h
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Fig. 1. Conﬁguration of Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1–3.H2–m (STP) 29,400 
Explosion 15:36, March 12, 2011 
Elapsed time 24.1 h 
rocess was found to signiﬁcantly reduce the suppression of the
ydrogen generation rate retarding the saturation with DH. As such,
he current estimation is much larger than those estimated in the
uthor’s previous publications (Saji, 2014a,b).
For numerical calculation a simple EXCEL® program was devel-
ped to solve 8 (columns) × 37 (including 13 buffer memory lines)
atrix through a relaxation technique for 1F4 SFP. For 1F1–1F3, the
atrix consists of 39 columns (with 13 buffer memory columns)
nd up to 50 lines of time segments to account for the time depend-
ncy of the decay heat. The results illustrated in Figs. 2–4 as well
s those summarized in Table 3 should be regarded as the consul-
ation values when water radiolysis is assumed to have occurred
hrough the RIE mechanism.
These values were made through various modeling studies
hich revealed the involvement of the following uncertainties:
1) The estimated values can be smaller than the actual ones since
the release (i.e., removal) of hydrogen gas through SRV into the
PCV is not considered. This assumption increases the DH con-
centration in the reactor water resulting in an effect of over
suppression of the RIE process.
2) The estimated values may  be smaller since the water level
inside the RPV is assumed as being unchanged until the ini-
tiation of the hydrogen explosion. When decay heat removal
through HPCS, IC or RCIC became unavailable, the steam release
through SRVs induced a gradual decrease in the water level.
3) Uncertainties induced by the residence time, which is the aver-
age time the water molecule should stay in the active part of the
fuel, and the duration of the reactor water ﬂowing through the
active region of the core, are assumed by the author’s engineer-
ing judgment. It may  have changed largely during the course
of the accident through decreasing decay heat, channel boiling
and the natural convection effect of the irradiated reactor water.
Fortunately this effect is not substantial as shown in Figs. 1–3
where the gradual accumulation of hydrogen gas with time is
shown for the residence time of 10 s and 100 s.
4) Mixing, dilution and the recirculation effects of water. The
author assumed it is proportional to the volume of irradiated
water and the reactor water involved in the in-vessel natural
circulation process.
In spite of these uncertainties, it is safe to say that the initial
oot cause of the hydrogen generation with the SBO is through RIE,
hich occurred before the onset of the zirconium-steam reaction.
he latter reaction may  have aggravated the Fukushima Daiichi’s
ccident situation.Fig. 2. Accumulated H2 in Unit 1 (m3-STP).
4. H2 generation in the spent fuel pool of 1F4TEPCO’s ofﬁcial view is in line with the hypothesis that the
hydrogen gas generated through the core-melt accident in the adja-
cent 1F3 leaked into 1F4 through the shared ventilation duct. The
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Fig. 3. Accumulated H2 in Unit 2 (m3-STP).
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verpressure in the 1F3 reactor containment vessel was vented
hrough an inverse Y (i.e.,  ) shaped pipe joint located at the bot-
om of the shared stack, which was shared between 1F3 and 1F4.
ach of the two legs of the pipe joint were connected to the vent
ines from 1F3 and 1F4. TEPCO’s explanation is hard to believe since
he high speed gas vented from 1F3 was more likely extracted the
ir from the 1F4 rooms at the pipe joint as in the case of a spray-
ng nozzle. In addition the hydrogen explosion in 1F4 SFP occurred
5.6 h after the last venting operation in 1F3, where the hydrogen
xplosion occurred at 11.01 of March 14th.
The basis of TEPCO’s argument is in the observed higher con-
entration of radioactive cesium deposited on 1F4’s ventilation
lter banks at their exhaust side rather than those of the inlet
anks. TEPCO’s emergency team also noticed a high dosimeter read-
ng (8 mSv) at 9 am of March 13th. They gave up entering the
F4 Reactor Building due to the high dose. The ﬂow reversal may
ave occurred at the time of the hydrogen explosion in 1F3 which
rupted at 11:01 on March 14th, however, TEPCO’s observation
oes not prove that the vented hydrogen from 1F3 ﬂowed contin-
ously into 1F4. Therefore the possibility of hydrogen generation
hrough RIE in 1F4 should also be investigated.
.1. Modeling of hydrogen gas generation in SFPs
The hydrogen generation rate was calculated by applying the
uthor’s theory as explained in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 with adapta-
ions to the SFP conﬁguration which includes decay heat, spent fuel
anagement as well as the placing of spent fuel racks in the pool.
ig. 5 illustrates a RIE model for the case when a region of the SFP
as cleared to store the evacuated core (i.e., 24th core loading) inFig. 5. Radiation-induced electrolysis in 1F4 SFP.
the left hand side zone as shown in Fig. 5 by moving the fuel bundles
from the previous 6 cycles to another side.
In Fig. 5, the natural circulation ﬂow route, conduction electro
ﬂow route as well as anodic and cathodic region are also illustrated.
Note that the electrons are ﬂowing from the anodic region (fuel
bundles from the previous 6 cycles) to the cathodic region (evacu-
ated core) where the absorbed gamma  dose rate in the pool water
was higher than the previous 6 cycles.
4.1.1. Operational cycles and spent fuel management
The new estimation begins with a more precise estimation of the
decay heat in 1F1 through 1F4 by tracing past re-fueling history to
the oldest spent fuels stored in the SFPs. Since re-fueling opera-
tions are performed for ¼ of the total core loading at a cycle, it was
necessary to follow the refueling records for the last 4–5 re-fueling
cycles which covers a time span of 6–10 years. The total number
of fuel assemblies moved to the SFP which were calculated from
the operational records is consistent with TEPCO’s recent inven-
tory data of the total spent fuel stored at the time of the accident
(TEPCO’s website, 2014) except for several fuel assemblies likely
stored in special containers which are provided for leaking or bent
fuel bundles.
The 1F4 SFP had a storage capacity of 1590 fuel assemblies. The
most recent (24th) fuel cycle was  completed on November 30, 2010
and the entire core loading of 548 fuel bundles were transported to
the SFP by shufﬂing the existing 685 spent fuel bundles exchanged
during the previous 6 cycles. However, it is not clear whether these
hot fuel assemblies were rearranged among the previously stored
spent fuel, which have a lower decay heat, or whether a region
was cleared to store the entire 24th core loading in one region by
moving the fuel bundles from the previous cycles. This uncertainty
results in a large variation in the estimated amount of hydrogen
generation due to the change in absorbed -dose rate and the total
volume of highly irradiated water.(1) Natural circulation between the evacuated core and old spent
fuels from past fuel exchange operations. Fuel assemblies were
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Table 4
Estimated total decay heat (on 3/11 2011).
Units SFP water (m3) DH (MWtotal) Water injection
1F1 1220 7.51E−02 2011/3/31∼
1F2 1425 4.45E−01 2011/3/20∼
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Fig. 6. Total ﬂow rate and ﬂow velocity through evacuated fuel assemblies in 1F4
spent fuel pool.
Table 5
Solubility of H2 and initial DO (mol/m3) at 1F4 Pool.
Temp. (◦C) Ca (H2) Ca (O2)
20 7.80E−01 2.72E−01
30  7.37E−01 2.30E−01
40  7.00E−01 1.96E−01
50  6.66E−01 1.69E−01
60  6.36E−01 1.47E−01
70  6.08E−01 1.29E−011F3 1425 4.13E−01 2011/3/17∼
1F4 1425 1.95E+00 2011/3/20∼
stored in spent fuel racks which allow water circulation from
the bottom through fuel assemblies.
2) The evacuated core is more cathodic due to higher decay heat
than the historical fuel assemblies.
3) Electron current should be ﬂowing from the historical
fuels → spent fuel racks → stainless steel liner → spent fuel
racks for the evacuated core → cathodic evacuated core.
4) Excess hydrogen should be released from the evacuated core
when the dissolved hydrogen exceed the solubility limit deter-
mined by Henry’s law.
.1.2. Decay heat
Table 4 summarizes decay heat of spent fuels stored in SFPs
stimated by applying the equations as per Section 3.5.1 to adapt
he operational history of spent fuel as summarized in the previous
ection.
It is reasonable to focus on the situation at 1F4 in view of the
act that the decay heat emitting from this SFP was approximately
 times larger compared to 1F2 and 1F3. If the accident is assumed
o have initiated one month after the last shutdown (i.e., December
0, 2011) in 1F4, then the decay heat was 3.55 MW.  This case will
lso be investigated in the follow-up calculation to clarify the safety
argin.
The estimated 1F4 decay heat value can be veriﬁed by using an
ctual measurement (TEPCO’s website, 2014), with the reported
ool water temperature of 84 ◦C at 4:08 on March 14th, 61.2 h after
he earthquake. The time span to reach this temperature is 53 h
13% error) in the author’s estimation when the initial pool water
emperature was assumed to be 25 ◦C. Note that the pool water
emperature was  increasing in an order of 10 ◦C per day. Since the
mpirical results are within errors of the order of +10% and −20%
f the ANS Standard (ANS-5.1, 1973), which likely contains some
afety margins, the results can be judged close to the actual value
f 1F4. A part of the deviation should also be due to convection heat
issipation from the pool water.
.1.3. Cooling of spent fuel in the pool
During the accident the spent fuel cooling should have been
ccomplished through a single-phase natural circulation or sub-
ooled boiling when the pool water temperature approached near
he boiling point. Since the boiling heat transfer removes the decay
eat very effectively, as such the overall mass ﬂow rate should have
ecreased substantially.
.1.3.1. Natural circulation modeling. Several videos taken on top of
he 1F4 pool during the accident were showing that the pool water
urface seems to be tranquil above the spent fuel racks when the
ool water temperature is below approximately 80 ◦C. Above this
emperature, noticeable “ripples,” as well as steam bubbles, were
dentiﬁed. This observation may  indicate either the occurrence of
ocal boiling or a release of hydrogen gas. In the following study,
oth a single-phase case as well as a two-phase natural circulation
ase are modeled.In the single-phase natural circulation heat transfer, the pool
ater enters from the bottom of the fuel, rising inside of the fuel
ssembly and then outﬂows into the bulk of pool water at 100 ◦C.
his assumption should provide a lower dissolved hydrogen gas80  5.84E−01 1.14E−01
90  5.61E−01 1.02E−01
transport from the active region. The residence time, which is the
average time that the water molecule should stay in the active part
of the spent fuel, is calculated through the heat balance necessary
to remove the decay heat. Results are shown in Fig. 6.
In the two-phase natural circulation modeling, it was  assumed
that sub-cooled boiling initiated at above 80 ◦C. Below this tem-
perature the single-phase natural circulation was it was assumed
to be dominant. With the initiation of the sub-cooled boiling, the
ﬂow velocity was assumed to have decreased sharply (approxi-
mately 6 × 10−5 m/s) due to its excellent heat transfer due to its
high evaporation heat.
4.1.3.2. Henry’s law (Sander, 1999). The SFP will not be able to retain
a DH higher than the solubility limit of hydrogen. The excess DH
concentration above the saturation concentration calculated with
Henry’s law can be applied to calculate hydrogen release rates.
(1) Dissolved hydrogen
It is assumed that the maximum pressure at the active water
zone is 2.2 atm. abs. (12 m from the pool water surface).
(2) Dissolved O2
The dissolved oxygen concentration for the in-ﬂow of the
water to the spent fuel was  calculated through Henry’s law with
the partial pressure of 0.20946 atm. This is to assume that the
bulk of the pool water is saturated with oxygen at its surface
(Table 5).
4.1.3.3. Temperature dependence of the reaction rate set. The sud-
den initiation of hydrogen releases as predicted in previous reports
(Saji, 2014a,b) is puzzling. This phenomenon appears to occur
through the RIE due to a breakdown of the radiation chemical con-
ﬁguration of the water chemistry at 40 ◦C in 1F4. The cause was
g and Design 307 (2016) 64–76 73
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Fig. 7. H2 gas generation in Unit 4 SFP (m3-STP/day).G. Saji / Nuclear Engineerin
raced back to the strong temperature dependence of the sponta-
eous decomposition of H radical:
 → H+ + e−aq (12)
hose reaction rate changes nearly three orders of magni-
ude between 20–100 ◦C (i.e., 3.70E + 00 → 1.31E + 03, respectively)
ccording to the reference (Elliot and Bartels, 2009). Obviously, fur-
her in-depth study on the predicted behavior of hydrogen release
s necessary.
.2. Estimation of hydrogen generation
.2.1. Conﬁguration of spent fuel in 1F4
The author realized the following uncertainties for further quan-
itative discussion.
1) Management of spent fuels for the core evacuation
The radiation calculation starts with G-values (i.e., mol/J)
which depends on the radiation chemical yield and the
absorbed dose rate of the irradiated water. Even with the
detailed estimation of decay heat as summarized in Section
4.1, the absorbed dose rate of pool water due to -irradiation
through the decay heat of spent fuel depends greatly on fuel
management. In some practices, spent fuel is stored (a) in loca-
tions which provide the largest criticality safety margin and
in other cases (b) with longer cooled fuel relocated to secure
positions for the new batch of incoming high decay-heat spent
fuel. Due to the shielding effects of the spent fuel from previous
cycles, case (a) results in a lower absorbed dose rate on average
but the volume of irradiated water increases.
2) Total volume of irradiated water
The total number of spent fuel assemblies in the 1F4 SFP was
1331 (i.e., the evacuated core load of 548 bundles plus 685 bun-
dles from previous cycles) at the time of the accident. In the new
calculation, all of the spent fuel was assumed to have been shuf-
ﬂed (i.e., mixed together) and stored in 22.2 standard spent fuel
racks which measured 1.2 m in width, 1.7 m in length and 4.2 m
in depth. The total volume of irradiated water is assumed to be
166 m3, which is equal to the total volume of water contained
in the spent fuel racks considering the linear absorption coef-
ﬁcient of -ray, which extends beyond the (neutron) effective
height (i.e., 3.66 m).
3) Recycling of the irradiated water
After irradiation of the water ﬂowing through the fuel
channels, it should contain different concentrations of stable
molecular species (i.e., H2, O2 and H2O2) compared with the
inlet concentrations. After being ejected from the spent fuel
assemblies, these molecular species should be mixed with the
bulk of the pool water and a portion should return to the fuel
bundles with the high decay heat. Through modeling studies,
the author found that the dilution and recycling process signiﬁ-
cantly affect the hydrogen generation rate. In the best estimate
calculation as covered in Section 4.2.5, the author will provide
a case with optimal mixing in the bulk of pool water.
.2.2. Update of previous estimation
Since TEPCO’s ofﬁcial scenario is not convincing, the author
nvestigated the possibility of hydrogen generation through RIE in
nit 4. The author ﬁrst anticipated that the RIE mechanism may
ot be involved in the hydrogen explosion event in 1F4 SFP. It is
ecause hydrogen generation levels off with time in the reactor
ore when the reactor water temperature is unchanged in 1F1–1F3
Saji, 2014a,b). This phenomena was found due to a rapid decrease
n decay heat and an increase in DH which further suppresses
he radiological decomposition of water. Nevertheless a poten-
ial hydrogen generation was investigated when the forced poolFig. 8. H2 gas generation in Unit 4 SFP (m3-STP/day).
water-cooling was terminated due to SBO and a gradual water
temperature increase occurred until it resulted in the hydrogen
explosion.
These observations lead the author to search for a potential
mechanism by changing the pool water temperature and ﬂow
velocity in the spent fuel. During the trial calculations it was discov-
ered accidentally that SBO induced a rapid initiation of electrolysis
when the pool water temperature exceeded 40 ◦C. The veriﬁcation
as presented in this paper revealed that an error had slipped in the
previous analysis (Saji, 2014b) while converting the G-values in a
conventional unit into an SI unit, thereby resulting in an overesti-
mation of the hydrogen generation and over simpliﬁcation related
to the effects of ﬂow rates.
The previous results are included in Fig. 7 and the updated
results are shown in Fig. 8. The estimated hydrogen generation rates
increases drastically when the pool water temperature exceeds
40 ◦C in both cases with the residence time (i.e. 1/ ˙ of Eq. (9)) of
1000 s whereas this surge is not as prominent in the forced convec-
tion region of 100 s in the updated results (Fig. 8).
The plant data used for these two calculations are unchanged,
although the absorbed dose rate was 3 orders of magnitude smaller
in the updated calculation. Fig. 8 reveals that the actual behavior of
the RIE is complicated due to the ﬂow velocity effect that induced
serious changes in the radiation chemical material balance.
When the coolant ﬂow rate is in the single-phase natural
convection regime, the hydrogen generation rate decreases after
◦surpassing 50 C. This strange behavior is found to be due to a del-
icate balance between the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations as
shown in Fig. 9. These two  concentrations appear as mirror images
of each other. A large amount of both the hydrogen and oxygen
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Fig. 10. H2 gas generation in Unit 4 SFP (m3-STP/day).
ases are generated when the pool water temperature exceeds
0 ◦C. This conﬁguration behaves as an “oxygen generator” between
0 and 80 ◦C with a natural circulation cooling, as shown in Fig. 9.
.2.3. Effects of spent fuel management in SFP
Fig. 10 demonstrates another update where the spent fuel with
igh decay heat was shufﬂed in the SFP using 22 racks (whereas
ig. 8 describes a situation where the evacuated core inventory
as localized by using 9 adjacent racks). The volume of the irra-
iated water was 166 m3 in the new calculation whereas it was
0 m3 in Fig. 8. A single-phase as well as sub-cooled boiling natural
irculation is assumed in Fig. 10 although the differences are not
ubstantial.
When the residence time is 100 s, the electrical current is ﬂow-
ng in a negative direction above 50 ◦C which indicates the reverse
eaction as deﬁned in Eq. (3) from the spent fuel with high decay
eat and hydrogen generation in the spent fuel from previous
ycles. The complex results of hydrogen generation calls for the
evelopment of a “safety map” although the author hesitates pro-
iding one at this time due to the lack of experimental data to verify
his hypothesis. Experimental data of the electrical current ﬂow-
ng between the anodic- and cathodic region is highly awaited for
urther veriﬁcation..2.4. Higher decay heat effects – a safety margin
Since the error introduced through the absorbed dose rate
esulted in a signiﬁcant difference in the rate of hydrogen pro-
uction, a veriﬁcation calculation was created to identify a safetyFig. 12. Best estimate H2 gas generation in Unit 4 SFP.
margin by changing the decay heat. Fig. 11 indicates the results
for two  cases where the SBO actually occurred on March 11, 2011
in the ﬁrst case whereas an arbitrary hypothetical case assumed to
occurred on January 1, 2011. In the second case, the core evacuation
was assumed to be completed one month after the reactor shut-
down. The decay heat in this case is approximately 3 times larger
than the ﬁrst case. The sudden bends in both curves at 80 ◦C are due
to the introduction of sub-cooled boiling at this temperature.
Note that the hydrogen generation rates increase substantially
with higher decay heat, approaching the shapes shown in Fig. 7.
4.2.5. Best estimation for the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4
After reviewing all of these modeling studies, the author pro-
vides the best estimation of the hydrogen generation rate with the
following parameters.
(1) Decay heat of the fuel bundles in the cathode: as introduced in
Table 2, the decay heat of fuels from 24th and 23rd cycles repre-
sent the dominant decay heat fuel bundles. The corresponding
total decay heat is 1.83 MWt  with the irradiated water volume
of 80.7 m3. The corresponding “dilution factor” was 0.09 in the
case of perfect mixing with the bulk of the pool water.
(2) Natural convection modeling: the single phase natural convec-
◦tion followed with sub-cooled boiling heat transfer above 80 C.
Other parameters follow Section 3.4 with the adaptation of the
1F4 SFP conﬁguration. The results are illustrated in Fig. 12. It should
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• Causes of ignition: in spite of the follow-up experiments, the
causes of ignition were not clariﬁed however it is suspected
to have been induced by minuscule particles of noble metal
deposited on the surface of the piping.G. Saji / Nuclear Engineerin
e noted that the hydrogen generation results from a very com-
licated material balance through radiation- and electro-chemical
rocesses. Some of the key factors of the processes include:
Absorbed dose rate and volume of irradiated water
Velocity (i.e., “residence time”) of the water in irradiation and
some mechanism of the irradiated water recirculation
Some mechanism of electrons transport between cathodic- and
anodic regions (i.e., “long-cell action”).
Some mechanism (e.g., depressurization through SRVs) to pre-
vent accumulation of generated hydrogen.
. Conclusions
Since the scientiﬁc cause for a series of hydrogen explosions
uring the Fukushima accident has not been established, this phe-
omenon was ﬁrst widely reviewed during normal operations to
evere accidents by performing scoping estimations.
Since the amount of hydrogen release is suppressed due to
everse reactions of the radiation chemical process, it is unlikely
hat the so-called water radiolysis is the root cause of the hydrogen
xplosion at Fukushima.
.1. Hydrogen generation upon SBO in 1F1–1F3
The author ﬁnally tested a new mechanism, “radiation-induced
lectrolysis,” which has been applied to his corrosion studies for the
ast several years. His theory has been veriﬁed with the published
n-pile test data of potential differences, although he has never tried
o apply it to a severe accident study. This theory enables one to esti-
ate the hydrogen generation rate upon SBO prior to the potential
ore disruption and melting where a zirconium-steam reaction may
e signiﬁcant.
The results predict that the total inventory of hydrogen gas
nside the RPV may  reach as much as 10,000 m3-STP in just half
 day during the SBO due to a high decay heat soon after the reac-
or trip. Therefore, in the event of a SBO the early safe disposal of
ccumulated hydrogen gas is indispensable in parallel with emer-
ency reactor cooling for boiling water reactors without hydrogen
osing to suppress water radiolysis.
.2. Hydrogen generation in 1F4 SFP
The author searched for a potential radiation chemical mecha-
ism for the hydrogen explosion in Unit 4 of the Fukushima Daiichi
uring the accident by changing the pool water temperature and
ow velocity of the spent fuel. During the trial calculations SBO
as found to have induced a rapid initiation of electrolysis when
he pool water temperature reached approximately 40 ◦C.
The present estimation of the hydrogen generation rate is still
arge enough to have induced the explosion in 1F4 SFP since as
arge as 1000 Nm3/d is estimated when the pool water temperature
xceeds approximately 40 ◦C. It also revealed that the behavior of
adiation chemical process is much more complicated than simply
he dependence on temperature. It depends on the management of
pent fuels in the SFP, absorbed dose rate and volume of irradiated-
nd mixing volume of water as well as its ﬂow velocity (i.e., resi-
ence time of the water staying in the highly active region of spent
uel).
In order to abide to these complexities the author proposes the
imple solution of inserting a ceramic insulator to prevent direct
etallic contact of the spent fuel racks to the SFP liner thereby
isconnecting the ﬂow of electrons from the anodic cooled fuel
ssemblies.
However the author has reservations regarding the current
esults as our knowledge is extremely limited as to the chemical Design 307 (2016) 64–76 75
characteristics of the cooling water in the core region. In particu-
lar the application of the author’s basic approach for his corrosion
study to the severe accident situation has been established essen-
tially without experimental data to verify. However the observed
phenomenology of a series of hydrogen explosions during the
Fukushima accident is not contradictory to the author’s prediction.
Obviously understanding the phenomena occurring through
radiation-induced electrolysis in the Fukushima accident is not
complete, and the theoretical framework of radiation chemistry
applicable to severe accidents in LWRs has to be more ﬁrmly estab-
lished.
Appendix A. A fact sheet of HAMAOKA UNIT 1 accident
This appendix summarizes the hydrogen-explosion/pipe-
rupture accident which occurred at the Hamaoka Unit 1 in a “fact
sheet” style (Fig. A1).
• Hamaoka Unit 1: 540 MWe,  BWR.
• Occurred: 17:02 on November 7th, 2001.
• Pant state: steady state of operation during a scheduled ECCS test
for manual start up of HPCI pump.
• Water chemistry: hydrogen water chemistry, supplemented with
noble metalTM water chemistry.
• Operators’ observation: blast noise observed by the operators of
the central control room as well as at local panels.
• Trip sequence: HPCI trip followed with containment isolation.
• Environmental monitoring: 30–40 nGy/h (no change).
• Conﬁrmation: a maintenance crew accidentally went inside the
reactor building, 17:20 and identiﬁed that the 1F and 2F ﬂoors
were wet  with water. The ﬁre alarms were triggered due to steam
leakage.
• Causes of the explosion: hydrogen burn induced from hydrogen
gas accumulated at the top portion of the Steam Condensate pip-
ing system. The hydrogen was  transported with steam which
condensed in this dead end pipe thereby releasing hydrogen gas.
• Hydrogen concentration: 0.6% volume in the similar riser pipe
location of RHRS A and 19% of O2 gas. Similarly in Unit 2 RHRS A,
H2 = 46%, O2 = 23%: RHRS B, H2 = 27%, O2 = 23%.
• Estimated hydrogen accumulation after 8 months of operation:
6–8 meter from the condensed water surface, with H2 = 66% and
O2 = 33%, N2 = 1%.Fig. A1. Pipe rupture at the steam condensate system of RHRS (pipe size:
OD = 165 m/m,  WT = 11 m/m).
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Ignition tests: self-ignition at 340–370 ◦C, 5–8 MP with dry mix-
ture of hydrogen and oxygen. No self-ignition with steam. Some
cases of self-ignition with a noble-metal catalysis.
Combustion to detonation transition: At 1–2 m from the ignition
point.
Maximum plastic deformation of pipes: greater than 23%.
Estimated leakage: approximately 2 tons of steam. The estimated
radioactive leakage was 8 × 108 Bq.
Brunsbüttel accident: a similar pipe rupture incident occurred on
December 14, 2001 at the Brunsbüttel NPP in Germany.
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